We Brought a City to Black Hat India. Then We Let People Break It.
On October 29, 2026, the Arsenal floor at the Sheraton Grand Bengaluru was doing what Arsenal floors do: humming with demos, tangled with laptop chargers, loud in the good way. In the middle of it, we had a dam quietly filling up, a traffic intersection cycling through its greens, a power substation holding 190 megawatts steady, a gas pipeline sitting at nominal pressure, and a wastewater pump doing its unglamorous job.
And all of it real enough to break. That is CyberCity, and Black Hat India 2026 Arsenal Lab is where we got to put it in front of people and say the thing we had been wanting to say for months: go ahead, attack it.
Why we built CyberCity
Start with what makes OT security fundamentally different from traditional IT security. When IT gets breached, you lose data, money, or uptime, and those are painful, but they are recoverable. OT is not about data; it is about physical things moving in the real world. Water behind a dam, voltage on a line, pressure in a gas pipeline. When OT fails, the consequences are physical too: a flood, a blackout, a ruptured pipeline, a sewage spill, and sometimes people get hurt. That is the weight OT security carries, and it is exactly the thing that is almost impossible to feel from a slide or a textbook.
If you have ever tried to learn ICS/OT security seriously, you have hit the same wall we did. The real hardware is expensive, it is restricted, and it is genuinely dangerous to practice on. Nobody is going to hand a student a live programmable logic controller (PLC) that controls an actual dam gate and say “have fun.” So most people learn the theory, look at some packet captures, read the incident write-ups, and never get to feel the consequence of a bad network action landing on a real process.
That gap matters more every year. The global ICS security market is projected to reach $41.82 billion by 2033, and the demand for people who can actually do this work already outpaces the supply. Critical infrastructure is under rising pressure: dams, water treatment plants, power grids, pipelines, sewage systems. The attacks are documented. The defenders are scarce. And the safest, most reproducible way to build that skill barely exists.
So we built one. CyberCity is a hands-on platform where you safely attack simulated critical infrastructure, watch it react in real time, and reset it in one click to try again.
What makes it feel real
A lab only teaches while it feels real; the moment it stops feeling real, the lesson goes with it. We made that our guiding principle early on: CyberCity would be real all the way down. And the part that brings it to life is the visualization. Every facility is drawn out on screen in real time, water climbing behind a dam, traffic lights cycling at an intersection, pressure building in a pipeline, so you do not just read that an attack worked, you watch it unfold.
Each facility also has its own Control Room, the same human-machine interface (HMI) dashboard a real operator would sit in front of all day, with live gauges, trend charts, alarm panels, and the pump and valve controls they would actually use. You get to see the facility from the operator’s chair, exactly as the people running it would, which is what makes watching an attack play out on that same screen hit so hard. Everything on it is the honest, live consequence of something actually happening underneath.
Two decisions carry the whole thing.
First, real protocols, not mocked APIs. Every facility speaks the actual industrial protocol it would speak in the field, on realistic ports. That means the tools you use against CyberCity are the exact tools you would use against a real plant. Nothing custom, nothing proprietary to the lab. What you learn here transfers directly.
Second, a live physics engine drives every consequence. The dam is not a number that goes up when you click a button. It is inflow versus outflow versus gate position versus head pressure, recalculated continuously. Close the sluice gate and the water genuinely rises until the spillway kicks in. The pipeline accumulates structural fatigue under sustained overpressure until the segment ruptures. The failure happens because the physics say it should.
Five facilities, five real incidents
The part that consistently stopped people at our table was this: every scenario mirrors a documented, real-world attack. You are not practicing on invented threats. You are re-walking history.
HydraGuard, the dam and water treatment plant. Modbus/TCP with zero authentication. Enumerate the registers, sniff the cleartext traffic, then close the gate to overflow the reservoir or spike the chlorine dosing to toxic levels. It echoes the Bowman Avenue Dam intrusion and the Oldsmar water-treatment incident, where an attacker tried to poison a city’s water supply.
MetroGrid, the four-way traffic intersection. SNMP with default community strings, the same weakness a 2014 University of Michigan study found across a real-world deployment of around a hundred intersections. Rewrite the signal timing, abuse emergency vehicle preemption, and then disable the conflict monitor so you can force opposing greens at once. That last move, defeating the independent safety system, is the pattern behind TRISIS.
Copperline Substation, 230/115kV. IEC 60870-5-104, one of the protocols Industroyer was built to speak. Trip breakers, disable the protection relays, and cascade a transformer overload into a full blackout, then kill the auto-recloser so the operators cannot simply reconnect. This is the Ukraine 2016 playbook, step for step.
Redwater Compressor Station, a gas pipeline. Modbus/TCP again, but this one has defense in depth: an electronic emergency shutdown system and an independent mechanical relief valve. Overspeed the compressor and the safety system trips it, which is the lesson. To actually cause damage you have to defeat both layers first, then inject false telemetry so the operator never sees it coming. That is the combined logic of TRISIS and PIPEDREAM, with a dash of Stuxnet-style deception.
Cedar Creek Lift Station 7, wastewater. This is pure denial of control: flood the cheap serial gateway until the station PLC goes blind, the pump loses its command, and the wet well overflows into a raw sewage spill while the operator’s HMI sits frozen. It is the Maroochy Shire sewage attack of 2000, the case that taught the world an insider with a radio could dump sewage into parks and rivers.
The Arsenal response
Here is what we learned standing at that table: the demo that lands is the one where someone else’s hands are on the keyboard.
The loop is simple. Pick a facility. Find the weakness. Exploit it. Watch it break on screen in real time. Reset and try the next one. We would get someone to run a single continuous Modbus poll against the dam PLC, watch nine registers stream back in plaintext with no authentication whatsoever, and you could see the moment it clicked, this is not a diagram, this is the device talking. Then they would run the attack, close the dam’s sluice gate with a single Modbus write, and watch the water actually start to rise.
The response was phenomenal. It was a thrill to see that much curiosity and engagement up close. Visitors came back with friends. Engineers from Schneider Electric stopped by, got hands-on with it, and found it very interesting. Schneider Electric is a world leader in manufacturing PLCs. They own the Modicon brand, which developed the world’s very first commercially successful PLC, the Modicon 084, back in 1968. We also had people from government bodies working in this space stop by, wanting to understand better how attacks like these actually work.
One day, five facilities, one city that let everyone who walked up take control of it. We could not have asked for a better room to do it in.
Try it yourself
CyberCity is open source. It runs entirely in Docker with no physical hardware required, and you can spin up the whole city and start attacking it in minutes.
If you break something in a way we did not expect, that is kind of the point. Tell us about it.
A glimpse
A few moments from the Arsenal floor at Black Hat India 2026.
